Abstract. We propose a framework for the analysis of delegation protocols. Our framework allows to analyse how accountability is transferred (or kept) by delegator when he transfers some of her rights to delegate. The ability to trace how accountability is distributed among principals of a system is crucial in many transactions that have a l e g a l v alue, because accountability is usually a prerequisite to guarantee other well known security properties (e.g., non repudiation). Our approach starts from the notion of \provability" to formalise accountability. Then, we i n troduce new speci cations for the analysis of delegation protocols and the distribution of credentials necessary to exercise delegated rights.
Introduction
In many e-commerce applications, as in the real-life, electronic transactions must be able to guarantee at least the same degree of accountability provided by c o n ventional transactions. For example, let us consider the case of a manager delegating her system administrator to backup her les containing important documents. In case something goes wrong and the documents will be unrecoverable, it would be useful for both, the manager and the system administrator, to have m e c hanisms that help them to prove to a third party their behaviour and doing so to determine accountability of facts. From this example it is clear the importance of the property of accountability that we de ne as: the property whereby the association of a principal with an object, an action or a right can be p r oved to a third p arty This paper provides an original contribution to the problem of the analysis of protocols that requires accountability. Among all the protocols that require this property w e will focus our attention to delegation protocols. This is motivated by the fact that delegation is usually the general mechanism used to transfer accountabilities among principals. Besides a lot of work has been done on the analysis of protocols, but few of these analysis have considered delegation protocols.
Accountability
For our analysis we start from a framework introduced by Kailar 5] specifically for analysing and describing accountability in order to analyse this property in delegation protocols.
This framework is based on the notion of provability, that is the ability of participants in a protocol to prove a statement to a third party, that is the basis for accountability. A participant can prove a statement t o a n y other principal if he can convince the latter about the statement. The proof of a statement x is generically de ned as the ability starting from known assumptions, to produce a set of statements that can convince any other principal about x. In practice it is enough (and easier) to convince a particular third party (a judge) rather than all the other principals that did not participate to the protocol.
We agree with Kailar that his approach is more suitable to analyse accountability rather than other approaches based on belief 1] and its evolution within the protocol, because these approaches focus on what can be proved only by the participants of the protocol, while the point o f view of external observers is essential to accountability.
In this section, we p r o vide a short review of the basics of the adopted framework, referring to 5] for a more detailed description.
In section 2.4, we will introduce new postulates that permit to analyse delegation of accountability i n c o m m unication protocols.
Finally, in section 3, we will analyse two c o m m unication protocols with support for delegation: the SPX protocol 8] and the Delegation of Accountability protocol 2]. Our analysis will show the usability of our approach.
Symbols and Concepts
In a generic communication protocol, we h a ve a group of principals (A, B, ...), that exchange messages within each other. During the analysis of a protocol, we w ant to focus on the ability of principals to prove the origin of these messages. The statement made by e a c h message is the message interpretation statements are denoted by l o wer-case letters (x, y, ...). A proof of a statement x is something that convinces another principal of statement x. W e are not worrying about the steps of a proof, because they largely depend on the environment where the protocol is designed to work.
Considering that we de ned accountability as the property whereby the association of a principal and an object/action/right can be proved to a third party, w e need to introduce objects, actions and rights into our language. We will denote a set of rights with a greek upper-case letter ( :::). Observe that in the rest of a paper, the term right is used also to indicate an object (right t o use a given object) or an action (right t o do a g i v en action).
To improve the readability of the paper, we w i l l a void to introduce and use new mathematical symbols. Instead, we will use common phrases like \can prove" or \can exercise" written concatenated (i.e., \CanProve" or \CanExercise"). Moreover, we will introduce only concepts and postulates that are needed to understand the paper and the process of analysing a delegation protocol for proving the accountability property. Informal descriptions of these concepts are given below:
A CanProve x: Principal A can prove the statement x to any third party B. This implies that A is able to perform a sequence of operations that lead to prove statement x to a principal B, whoever is B. This proof does not reveal any secret y 6 = x. This is a Strong proof, because a principal A can prove the given statement t o e v eryone. We t a l k a b o u t Weak proof if the ability of the prover permits to prove the given statement only to another principal.
In this case, we can write \A CanProve x to B", where A and B are involved principals. In this paper we will use only strong proof. K Authenticates A: The key K can be used to authenticate the signature of principal A. As a consequence, we can associate A to any statement encrypted with K ;1 . K and K ;1 are public and private counterparts of an asymmetric key pair.
x in m: x is the interpretation of a (group of) eld(s) in message m. T The following de nitions of \CanExercise" appear for the rst time in this paper.
A CanExercise : This denotes the fact that principal A can exercise the rights listed in . I n a n a c c e s s c o n trol environment, a principal can exercise a right under some requirements 2 . W e use \CanExercise" only to associate principals to rights, in accordance to our de nition of accountability.
A CanExercise with K: If we w ant to specify the authentication key that a principal uses to exercise her rights, we can use this statement. Here, a principal A CanExercise the set of rights using K as her authentication key. Of course, the statement \ K Authenticates A" m ust be provable.
Assumptions
Some assumptions related to security constraints must be respected before validating analysis results. The digital signature scheme considered in this framework is public-key encryption paradigm based. Signature algorithms are assumed to be strong enough: (1) to be undisputably associated with a single user (2) to resist against the search of another principal's private key, independently by the available computing power, for a su cient 1 If a principal is trusted on a statement b y only another (or a group of) principal(s), we use the notion of non global trustness. In this paper we will only talk about global trust, even if more loosely: principal A is trusted on x by all principals in the intended audience of a proof. 2 For example, a principal can read/write the les of directory /Doc/Sec only if she belongs to the Security group. We are not concerning on aspects of how this requirements are checked or how this rights are assigned to principals by a system administrator. These aspects are strongly dependent on a given environment.
period of time (3) to withstand birthday attacks. Moreover, signature algorithms are assumed to provide message origin authentication, message content i n tegrity and message sender non-repudiation. Finally, signature algorithms do not require the consent of the signer. Another important group of assumptions is related to Trustness: principals are trusted not to share their private keys with other principals with whom they do not wish to be accountable, i.e., we trust principals that use caution to share their keys. Moreover, a principal is assumed to trust a statement if she is an authority of the given statement, or if she is convinced on the validity of the statement b y a trusted party.
Other important assumptions are about message integrity, a vailability of services and certi cate revocation. It is not possible to fake a signed message or to compute another private key that can be accepted as the authentic signature (message integrity) if A CanProve x, then we assume that, independently of the availability of the communication service, we can assure that A has the ability to send all the messages for proving x (availability of service) nally, statements proved by r e v oked public keys are considered valid only if the statements were signed when the related certi cates were also valid (certi cate revocation).
Postulates
Postulates introduced here are applicable to the analysis of accountability properties in electronic communication protocols. All postulates are given in the form: P Q R where P and Q are the premises of the rule: if they hold simultaneously, then the consequence statement R is true.
Conjunction: If A can prove that x is true and she can also prove that also y is true, then A can prove that the conjunction x^y is true.
Conj:
A This section introduces the formalization of the concept of a principal that can exercise a right (or a set of rights). A principal can exercise a right if another principal gave her the related permissions. These permissions can be given by a trusted authority (i.e., a system administrator), and can be delegated to another principal, whom, after delegation, can exercise the transferred rights.
In a generic delegation, principal A can delegate another principal B to exercise the set of rights only if A has the ability to exercise them. Moreover, A must be accountable for having delegated B to exercise , and, nally, B must be authenticated when she exercise . The following postulate formalizes these ideas: CanExercise1:
A CanExercise A Says (delegation of to B) (K Del Authenticates B) B CanExercise with K Del That is, principal A can exercise the set of rights and she delegates B to exercise these rights. Key K Del authenticates principal B: when B will exercise , she will be authenticated using K Del .
to describe the power of a principal to exercise a given set of rights, we can omit the speci cation of this key. The following postulate relates both ways to use \CanExercise" clause.
CanExercise2: A CanExercise with K A CanExercise
In our analysis, we w ant to proof the accountability of a principal on a set of rights that have been delegated by another principal. In other words, the goal of such a p r o o f i s t o s h o w t h a t :
delegate CanProve ( delegate CanExercise with K Del ) where K Del is the delegation key of the given protocol.
During analysis of delegation protocols, we will use postulates CanExercise1 and CanExercise2 in conjunction with Inf postulates, in order to unify \CanProve" and \CanExercise".
Another important g o a l t o v erify during analysis of a delegation protocol is the ability for delegator to prove that she is not associated with delegate's actions. When a set of rights has been transferred from A to B and principal B is exercising using delegation key K Del , then principal A is not accountable for this B's activity. This second generic goal can be formalized with the following statement:
delegator CanProve ( K Del Authenticates delegate) 3 
Analysis of Delegation Protocols
In this section, we s h o w some examples of protocols analysis. In particular, we apply our analysis framework to SPX 8] and to the Delegation of Accountability protocol 2]. In these two analyses it will be possible to show the di erence between two di erent delegation's philosophies: SPX permits grantor to delegate grantee the possibility to act on grantor's behave in the other approach, grantor transfers the accountability o n a set of rights of her own.
3.1 SPX with support for Delegation Protocol description In SPX 8] , principals use authentication tokens to authenticate each other. The authentication token permits the secure exchange of a session key. A simpli ed version of SPX is analysed in 5] in order to verify accountability properties. In this section, we summarize the content of the previous analysis and we w i l l s h o w that this protocol doesn't allow accountability on a set of transferred rights.
Involved principals are: a claimant (C), a certi cate distribution center (CDC), and a server (S). Moreover, we h a ve also principals TA 1 and TA 2 , that, together with CDC, play the role of trusted authorities. The goal of the protocol is for S to securely receive a delegation key from C. In this delegation context, principal C authorizes another principal (S) to act on her behalf by sharing a set of rights with C for a given period of time. The protocol is not designed for delegation of accountability, because the transferred rights will be still accountable to C.
The protocol description is the following: request is send to the certi cate distribution center, that replies (message 2) with a certi cate of S, issued by the trusted authority TA 1 . T h i s certi cate is encrypted with CDC's private key. C sends her delegation public key (K Del ) t o S (message 3), signing it with her authentication key (K ;1 C ). K Del is valid for a period of time T. Moreover, C sends to S a symmetric session key (K des ) encrypted with S's public key (K S ). C encrypts the private part of the delegation key with the session key K des and she also sends it to S. Finally S asks for C's certi cate to CDC(message 4 and 5) and after receiving the certi cate, S veri es C's credentials and replies to C the response (message 6).
Reformulating the Protocol The protocol has been reformulated with the adopted notation by K a i l a r i n 5 ] . W e report here the protocol message interpretation described in the previous analysis. Only messages 2, 3 and 5 w ere considered relevant to the analysis: Protocol Analysis As we reminded at the beginning of this section, the delegation goal pointed by the Kailar's analysis was to verify the delegate's ability o f p r o ving that the delegation key authenticates delegator. In other words, the goal of the analysis showed by K a i l a r w as:
Goal] S CanProve ( K Del Authenticates C)
Principal C can exercise the transferred set of rights, but S will still be accountable for them, because K Del authenticates her. As we said in section 2.4, we wish to show that: C CanProve ( K Del Authenticates S), in order to give C the possibility to prove her independency by delegate's actions. If we w ould be able to show the previous statement, it will be true together with Goal statement proved by Kailar, meaning that K Del authenticates both delegator and delegate. In this case, we lose accountability property. As a consequence, SPX protocol does not support delegation of accountability. This protocol allows principals to delegate their own accountability t o any other principals. It assumes that each principal can generate publickey pairs and has access to a digital signature service. Moreover, it assumes that each principal can get the public key(s) needed to verify digital signatures that she may receive, included the keys used for authentication purposes. We do not specify in our description the part concerned with authentication of principals, which w e assume already done when the delegation protocol starts. The delegation protocol is speci ed as follows:
